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In this paper we present two composite indices of globalization. The first is based on the
Kearney/Foreign Policy magazine and the second is obtained from principal component
analysis. They indicate which countries have become most globalized and show how
globalization has developed over time. The indices are composed of four components:
economic integration, personal contact, technology and political engagement, each
generated from a number of variables. A breakdown of the index into major components
provides possibilities to identify sources of globalization and associate it with economic
policy measures. The empirical results show that a low rank in the globalization process
is due to political and personal factors with limited possibility for the developing
countries to affect. The high ranked developed countries share similar patterns in
distribution of various components. The indices were also used in a regression analysis
to study the causal relationship between income inequality and globalization.
Globalization indices explain only 7 to 11 per cent of the variations in income inequality
among countries.
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1 Introduction
Globalization is defined as the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital across
borders. It is a contentious process by which the western market economies have effectively
spread across the globe. Although it does not constitute a new phenomenon, it is viewed as
an inexorable integration of markets, nations and technologies to a degree never witnessed
before in a way that is enabling individuals, and corporations, to reach around the world
further, faster, deeper and more economically than ever before. By contrast, some groups of
scholars and activists view globalization as an ideological project of economic liberalization
that subjects states and individuals to more intense market forces.
Globalization causes rapid changes in trade relations, financial flows, and the mobility of
labour across the world and has brought the (developed) national economies closer
together and made them more strongly interrelated. However, there is a large
heterogeneity in the degree of the process of globalization over time and across countries
and regions. This heterogeneity causes disparity in development and urges the need for
research to find the sources of disparity and quantification of its magnitude and impacts.
In recent years, theoretical research on the link between globalization and world
inequality has been intense. However, analysis of the link at the empirical level is
scarce. The causal connections between globalization and inequality in developing
nations are best understood by building on what we have learned about inequality
change during the pre-globalization phase. Extensive empirical research points to two
stylized facts. First, there is no structural relationship between growth and inequality.
Second, income inequality levels in the pre-globalization phase were generally
immobile and trendless.
There is a comprehensive body of literature on the historical perspective and descriptive
nature of globalization and its impact on for instance inequality amongst nations.
Despite the great importance that is placed on the globalization process of the world
economy, its sources and consequences remain poorly understood. The relationship
between inequality and the number of channels through which globalization affects
world (in)equality have been investigated. The channels identified are: commodity price
equalization, factor price convergence due to international migration, capital mobility
reducing wage inequality and differentials in marginal products and rates of return of
capital among countries, and dynamic convergence in per capita income growth where
the growth rate is positively related to the distance to the steady state.
The objective of this study is to investigate the usefulness of the recently created
database by Kearney in the development of an index of globalization. The index is
based on countries’ economic integration, personal contact, technology and political
engagement. The main features of this study are as follows:
—  using the same data reproduce the globalization index introduced by Kearney;
—  an alternative globalization index is obtained using principal component
analysis;6
—  countries are compared by their integration in the world economy. A
decomposition of the indices into underlying components quantifies individual
factors’ contribution to the integration;
—  the indices in addition to international level globalization are further used for
between and within region comparisons. The indices are expected to serve as
useful tools in evaluation of the impact of globalization on the welfare of
nations and regions. The hope is to generate interest and research on important
issues like analysis of the globalization process and evaluation of its impacts
on developing economies;
—  the indices are used in regression analysis to study the causal relationship
between income inequality and globalization. However, globalization indices
explain only 7 to 11 per cent of the variations in income inequality among
countries;
—  given our experience, we provide guidelines for the creation of a globalization
database based on national data and a modified globalization index
incorporating more relevant determinant factors.
This study is organized as follows. Following a review of the literature on the link
between globalization and world inequality in Section 2, Section 3 provides a brief
description of how the index of globalization has been constructed. In Section 4 the data
is described and variables used in the analysis are defined, followed in Section 5 by a
discussion of the results. In Section 6 the link between globalization and income
inequality are discussed and guidelines on possible extensions and for future research
are presented. Section 7 is the summary and conclusion.
2 A review of the literature
In reviewing the literature on globalization we identify a number of directions. The last
two centuries can be classified into different periods or phases. Therein a number of
approaches link globalization to convergence/divergence, and inequality/equality issues.
Links have also been made to poverty and traditional and non-traditional factors causing
inequality; the impact on wage inequality at a micro level is one such topic, though the
implications of globalization for within- and between-country inequality and how
globalization influences world inequality are all noted in the literature. Governance
issues also arise, drawing upon the benefits of globalization and suggesting how to
reduce negative impacts better. While the economic component is dominant, some
views find globalization misinterpreted and its quantitative (economic and financial)
extent exaggerated. In this section we report the main findings in each of these
directions from a selection of studies.
Globalization periods and main approaches
Globalization is not a new phenomenon. The process has its roots in the second half of
the eighteenth century. In O’Rourke and Williamson (2000), O’Rourke (2001),
Maddison (2001) and Williamson (2002) the period 1870-2000 is classified into: the
first wave of globalization 1870-1913, the de-globalization period of 1913-1950, the
golden age of 1950-1973, and the second wave of globalization of 1973 onwards.7
In recent years, research on the link between globalization and world inequality has
been intense. Three main approaches are distinguished by Wade (2001). First, the
neoclassical growth theory predicts that national economies will converge in their
average productivity levels and average incomes because of increased mobility of
capital. Second, the endogenous growth theory predicts that increasing returns to
technological innovation in developed countries offsets diminishing returns to capital.
In short the neoclassical theory predicts convergence (equality) while the endogenous
theory predicts less convergence or divergence (inequality). Third, the dependency
approach predicts that convergence is less likely and divergence more likely, because of
differential benefits from economic integration and trade, restricted free market
relations, and developing countries locked into producing certain commodities.
Globalization and convergence/divergence issues
The empirical evidence shows that during the first wave of globalization convergence in
per capita income and real wages took place within the Atlantic economy due to an
increase in international trade and massive international migration. The de-globalization
period is characterized as widening disparity between the richest and the poorest regions,
and among the Atlantic economy reverting to the convergence trend of the previous
period. The golden age period was 25 years of rapid growth, relative stability and
declining inequality. There was considerable convergence among Western European
economies and the OECD, and a decline in the GDP gap in per capita income between the
poorest and the richest regions (see Solimano, 2001). It is argued that neoclassical effects
of trade and changes in the supply of input factors provide more insight. Increased trade,
stimulated by falling transportation costs, and factor movements caused prices of locally
scarce factors to fall and promoted factor price convergence.
Globalization-inequality-poverty links
Economic growth has often been given priority as an anti-poverty measure, but the
negative link between growth and inequality has been largely ignored by policymakers.
Rising inequality threatens growth and the poverty reduction targets calling for more
distributionally favourable pro-growth policies. Cornia and Court (2001) in a policy
brief using the WIID,1 covering the second wave of globalization, report changes in
within-country income inequality and on the link between poverty, inequality and
growth. The analysis highlights five main issues. First, inequality has risen since the
early-mid 1980s. Second, the traditional common factors causing inequality, such as
land concentration, urban bias and inequality in education, are not responsible for
worsening the situation. Third, the persistence of inequality at high levels makes
poverty reduction difficult; there is a negative relationship between inequality and the
poverty alleviation elasticity of growth (Cornia and Kiiski, 2001). Fourth, a high level
of inequality can depress the rate of growth and have undesirable political and social
impacts (see also Birdsall, 2000). Fifth, developments in Canada and Taiwan show that
low inequality can be maintained at a fast growth rate.
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The non-traditional new causes of inequality identified are liberal economic policy
regimes and the way in which economic reform policies have been carried out. Land
reform, expanding education and active regional policy are recommended as measures
to reduce inequality among areas, gender and regions. Policies offsetting the inequality
impact of new causes are designed and incorporated in a revised development approach,
called the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ by Stiglitz (1998). These policies include
measures to offset the impacts of new technologies and trade, macroeconomic stability,
careful financial liberalization and regulation, equitable labour market policies, and
innovative tax and transfer policies. The international community should include
distribution issues in their policy advice, avoid distributive distortions, support to reduce
output volatility and increase external budgetary support.
Agénor (2003) examines the extent to which globalization affects the poor in
developing countries. The focus is on the channels through which trade openness and
financial integration may have adverse effect on poverty.2 Cross country regression
analysis relates globalization to poverty and control for various macroeconomic and
structural variables. Results suggest evidence of an inverted U-shape relationship
between globalization and poverty indicating that globalization at low (higher) levels
tends to increase (reduce) poverty. Globalization and trade liberalization make
consumer price subsidies directed to poverty reduction inefficient by calling for their
removal or reduction. Results from Tunisian food policy evaluation indicate that
gradual subsidy removal would increase the relative position of non-subsidy products
and affect low income groups (Dhehibi and Gil, 2003).
Modes of globalization
Globalization has different dimensions with different impacts and can be looked at from
different perspectives. James (2002) analyses the causes of globalization in terms of
transaction costs and focuses on information and communication technologies as well as
technical change and foreign investment deriving from globalization and their
application to developing problems in Africa. Bhagwati (2000) focuses on trade and
foreign direct investment. Globalization is both economically and socially benign, that
is it can, as a general tendency, produce beneficial consequences for a variety of social
objectives. Appropriate governance is needed to manage globalization and the speed at
which it must be pursued. There is disagreement about the effects of globalization on
income distribution of countries. International trade theory implies that increased trade
and foreign investment should make income distribution more equal in poor countries
and less equal in rich countries. La Porta et al.’s (1999) examination shows that from
the perspective of promoting development the performance and quality of government
across countries varies in systematic ways; common law countries have better
governments than French civil law or socialist law systems, Protestant countries
generally have better governments than Catholic or Muslim countries. Milanovic (2002)
attempts to discern the effects of trade and foreign investment on relative income shares
of low and high deciles using household budget surveys. The results show that the
                                                
2  For another comprehensive analysis of globalization, growth and poverty see Dollar and Collier
(2001).9
effects of openness on income distribution depend on the country’s initial income level.
At very low levels the rich benefit, but the situation changes as income levels rise.
Seshanna and Decornez (2003) find that during the last 40 years the world economy has
become wealthier, more globally integrated, but unequal and polarized in sharpening the
division between rich and poor countries.
The issues of economic globalization, domestic politics and income inequality in
developed countries is studied by Mahler (2001). The results from regression analysis
show little evidence of a systematic relationship between any of the three main modes of
economic globalization (trade, foreign direct investment and financial openness) or either
of the distribution of disposable income or earnings of households. The overall conclusion
is that integration into the world economy does not systematically lead to an inegalitarian
distribution of income or earnings across entire economies; the modes of globalization are
weakly and positively related to the fiscal redistribution in the countries studied. Empirics
show that politics continues to play a critical role in determining distributive outcomes in
the developed world; economic globalization is compatible with a variety of political
interactions leading to a range of distributive outcomes.
Influences of globalization
In their studies of the link between globalization and inequality Lindert and Williamson
(2001) and O’Rourke (2001) state that increased world inequality has been driven by
between-country rather than within-country inequality. It follows that globalization will
have very different implications for within-country inequality, depending on the
dimension of globalization involved on the country concerned, and on the distribution
of endowments. The fact that the world economy has become more globally integrated
can be interpreted as that globalization has raised inequality between nations. The
direction of impact on within-country inequality depends on participating country’s
changes in their policy to exploit it. In this view, the net impact of globalization is too
small to explain the long-run rise in world inequality since 1800. The source of
inequality in a globalized world with vast regions with inferior education and chaotic
institutions could be poor government and non-democracy, not globalization.3
Based on exploring the components of inequality, the sources and degree of
globalization, and the historical time path, Lindert and Williamson (2001) classified the
influence of globalization on inequality in five conclusions. The conclusions are in part
based on regression of normalized inequality for unskilled workers on real wage,
migration impact, and trade variables. First, the widening income gaps between
countries that integrated into the world economy have probably been reduced. Second,
within labour-abundant countries, emigration and opening up to international trade
before 1914 lowered inequality. Third, within labour-scarce countries, immigration and
opening up to international trade raised inequality. Fourth, accounting for all
international and intra-national effects, more globalization has reduced inequality. Fifth,
complete global integration does not make inequality vanish, but inequality is lower
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causes of wage and income inequality in developed economies.10
under integration than segmentation. The source of further inequality would be poor
government and non-democracy in lagging countries, rather than globalization.
Williamson (1996) concludes that evidence shows that globalization had the same
impact on income distribution in the late nineteenth and in the late twentieth centuries:
inequality rose in rich countries and fell in poor countries.
Wage inequalities
Several studies address the wage links between globalization and inequality. The effects
of globalization on skill premium, unemployment, and countries social policies are
addressed by Ethier (2002). Empirical literature concludes that trade has played a minor
role in the rise of skill premium rather than skill-biased technical change. Here it is
assumed that outsourcing and unskilled labour are highly substitutable and that capital
equipment and skilled labour are complementary. Globalization offers a possible
explanation to stylized facts in the above. Miller (2001) demonstrates that globalization
explains a significant increase in earnings inequality from declining relative wages of
unskilled workers in the US since the late 1970s. Most of the increase in wage inequality
results from changes in the structure of production, in part by outsourcing involving
moving unskilled-intensive production process to low-income countries. Miller finds that
halting globalization will do little to offset the rising inequality that has already occurred.
Eckel (2003) in analysing the role of wage rigidities in labour market adjustment to
international trade and biased technological progress shows that changes in relative wages
are independent of wage rigidities, but wage inequality is affected by capital market
integration. Manasse and Turrini (2001) study the effects of globalization on income
inequality by looking at trade integration in the form of lower transportation costs and
improved production and communication technologies benefitting the quality of products
and rising consumer satisfaction. In the first case, redistribution from non-exporting to
exporting firms and changing demand for skills results in income inequality. In the latter,
the effect is ambiguous. Globalization, although improving welfare, is likely to raise
inequality. Redistribution, rather than protection, should be the answer.
Governing globalization
A number of measures could reduce the negative impacts of the rapid globalization
process. The current system is incapable of dealing with the surfacing problems. Nayyar
and Court (2002) summarize the results from a major WIDER project on governing
globalization, where they identify the main ways in which the governance needs of the
world economy and policy can be strengthened. A new structure of governance, reforms
and new institutions are proposed to better protect the interests of poorer developing
countries. Addison and Rahman (2002) identify that geographical characteristics,
institutional and political factors, economic policy and histories matter for an individual
country’s capacity to globalize. Regarding the importance of institutional capacity for
globalization and openness Chirathivat and Murshed (2001) argue that domestic
institutional capacities in Southeast Asia were inadequate to cope with the influx of
capital to prevent the recent Asian crisis.11
Critiques on globalization
Bordo et al. (1999) in their comparison of trade, finance and economic integration today
and pre-1914 conclude that commercial and financial integration before the First World
War was more limited but trade tensions and financial instability have not worsened in
recent years; institutional innovations and their stabilizing role explain this. However,
the threats are real and pressing especially for smaller, more open and lower-income
countries. In a critical paper Sutcliffe and Glyn (1999) find globalization widely
misinterpreted and its quantitative extent and novelty exaggerated. They criticize the
research on the basis of the use of inappropriate statistical measures, conclusions drawn
from limited data, failure to make historical comparisons and to see counter-
globalization tendencies. Analysis based on trade, direct investment, multinational
corporations’ activities, and national and global production volumes suggests that
globalization is neither new nor so great as is often supposed.
Recent literature on economic geography considers globalization as the catalyst for
structural change (Peri, 2002). Decrease in transport costs trigger the emergence of
agglomeration economies that generate increasing returns by factor relocation,
concentration of production in one sector, or in one location, as a source of within country
inequality. Transportation plays a dualistic role as a pro-active agent of globalization and
as a beneficiary of its development. However, regional inequalities in accessibility,
standardization and multi-modal transport and governance of global transportation limits
globalization opportunities (Janelle and Beuthe, 1997). The growth of the information
technology service sector (Zagler, 2002) and reduced manufacturing sector in the new
economy also affect productivity growth, and inequality within and between countries.
Pieterse (2000) argues that globalization involves a trend towards human integration, but
that this is a long-term, uneven and paradoxical process. In global human integration,
widening human cooperation and deepening inequality go together. Ravallion (2003)
offers a non-technical commentary of the conceptual and methodological differences
underlying the debate on globalization. In line with Sen (2002) the concern is continuing
deprivation and rising disparity in standards of living. Ravallion suggests that before
quantification of the effects one must first be clear about the concept to be measured and
the choice of measurement. The conceptual differences carry considerable weight for the
position one takes in the debate. Lack of distinction between inequality between and
within countries, differences in underlying assumptions made in measurement, and data
are among the sources of conflicting claims.
In studying the link between the type of export and inequality Calderón and Chong
(2001) find that primary export countries, of which most are developing ones, are
associated with an increase in inequality, while manufacturing exporters, of which most
are developed, are linked with decreasing inequality. Despite increasing inequality,
Mayer (2001) finds that globalization has improved access to new technologies and
provides unique opportunities for poor countries to raise their incomes, however
countries differ in technology upgrading and skill accumulation of their domestic labour
force (see also Meyer, 1999).12
Summary
Theoretical research on the link between globalization and world inequality and
channels through which it affects inequality, are intense. Three main approaches are
distinguished. The neoclassical growth theory predicts convergence because of
increased mobility of capital. The endogenous growth theory predicts less convergence
or divergence because of increasing returns to technological innovation in developed
countries. The dependency approach predicts that divergence is more likely because of
differentials in benefits from economic integration and trade and a locked production
structure in less developed countries. Based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data
there is little evidence of a systematic relationship between three modes of globalization
namely trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial openness, and either the
distribution of disposable income or earnings of households. Integration into the world
economy does not lead to inegalitarian distribution of income or earnings across entire
economies. Globalization has increased between-country inequality, but it does not
explain the long-term rise in world income inequality. Inequality is lower under
integration than segmentation. The within-country distributive outcome can not fully be
linked to globalization. Rising within-country inequality can be explained by the
countries’ inferior education, chaotic institutions, poor governments and non-
democratic domestic (re)distributive politics.
3 A composite globalization index
Creation of a comprehensive globalization database and construction of a composite and
decomposable index of globalization is an important research issue.
3.1 The Kearney index
Kearney (2002, 2003) is the first attempt to construct a database and to compute a
composite globalization index. The index is a simple combination of forces driving the
integration of ideas, people, and economies worldwide. It is composed of four major
components: economic integration, personal contact, technology, and political
engagement, each generated from a number of determinant variables. The total number
of variables used in the computation of the globalization index is 13.4
The index quantifies economic integration by combining data on four key variables
namely trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio capital flows, and income payments
and receipts. It gauges technological connection by accounting for internet users,
internet hosts, and secure servers. The index assesses political engagement by taking
stock of the number of international organizations and UN Security Council missions in
which each country participates and the number of foreign embassies that each country
hosts. Personal contact is charted by looking at international travel and tourism,
                                                
4  The total number of variables is 36 including year of observation, country, and country codes. The
remaining variables reflect the direction of trade, FDI, travel, portfolio investment, and international
calls.13
international telephone traffic, and across-borders money transfers. The globalization
index (GINDEX) is based on normalization of individual variables and subsequent
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where i and t indicate country and time periods, m and j are within and between major
component variables,  m ω  are the weights attached to each contributing X-variable
within a component,  j ω are weights attached to each component, min and max are
minimum and maximum values of respective variables across countries in a given year.
The index is similar to a commonly used Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is
based on educational attainment, life expectancy and real GDP per capita.5
3.2 The principal component index
In calculation of the Kearney (2002, 2003) globalization index, the component’s
weights are chosen on an ad hoc basis. We consider this index a basic or benchmark
index. In the basic index each of the 13 determinants of the index are given equal
weight (w=1). In the alternative case, a number of variables were given double weights
(w=2). Ideally the weights should differ by countries and over time.
An alternative approach could be to use principal component (PC) or factor analysis to
compute an index of globalization. In this paper we adopt the principal component
approach. PC analysis is a multivariate technique for examining relationships among
several quantitative variables. It was originated by Pearson (1901) and further developed
by Hotelling (1933). PC analysis has been used in many areas such as the computation of
an environmental index (Kang, 2002). Recently, Agénor (2003) used trade and financial
openness to compute a simple globalization index based on PC analysis.
Given a dataset with p numeric variables, at most p principal components can be
computed; each is a linear combination of the original variables with coefficients equal to
the eigenvectors of the correlation of the covariance matrix. The eigenvectors are taken
with unit length. The principal components are sorted by descending order of the
eigenvalues, which are equal to the variance of the components. The first (last)
component has the largest (smallest) variance of any unit length linear combination of the
determinant variables. This method gives a least square solution to the following model:
it J Jit it it it e X X X Y + + + + = β β β ..... 2 2 1 1  (2)
where X is the matrix of J (j = 1, 2, …, J) factor scores, βj is the factor pattern and e
residuals. Here we minimize the sum of all the squared residuals, distances from the
point to the first principal axis. In the least squares case the vertical distance to the fitted
line is minimized.
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for some improvements, see Noorbakhsh (1998).14
The two globalization indices indicate which countries have become most globalized
and quantifies the state of inequality in globalization among countries and regions. It
shows how globalization has developed for different countries and regions over time. A
breakdown of the index into major components provides possibilities to identify sources
of globalization. It is valuable to associate this information with economic policy
measures to bring about desirable changes in national and international policies. The
indices as shown later can also be used to study the causal relationship between
globalization, inequality, growth and a number of other (macroeconomic) variables
frequently found in the literature like poverty, openness, wages, and liberalization.
4 The data
The database created by Kearney/Foreign Policy magazine (2002, 2003)
6 is unique and
the first of this kind to serve as a basis for computation of a globalization index. This data
is a small balanced panel covering 62 countries observed for the period 1995-2001, and
was originally collected from national sources and international organizations and
financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Several variables were normalized by the
source prior to their receipt. Kearney fills gaps in the data from other sources like the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Netcraft.com (for example, all data on Taiwan is
obtained from the EIU).
The data variables on economic integration, personal contacts, technology, political
engagement and supplemental data are expected to proxy the channels through which
globalization affects world inequality. As indicated earlier these channels are identified by
commodity price equalization, factor price convergence and dynamic convergence in per
capita income growth towards the steady state.
The data on economic integration consists of four variables: trade, foreign direct
investment, portfolio capital flows, and income payments and receipts. The data
originates from the IMF and International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. All four
variables are given as a share of GDP. The trade variable includes total trade and is
measured as the sum of goods (imported and exported) and services (credits and debits).
FDI is measured as an aggregate of in- and outflows of FDI. Portfolio flows is measured
as the sum of portfolio inflows and outflows. The last variable, income payments and
receipts, includes the compensation of non-resident employees and income earned and
paid on assets held abroad.
The second component on personal contact consists of three variables: international
telephone traffic, international travel and tourism, and transfer payments and receipts. The
telephone traffic variable is defined as per capita sum of incoming and outgoing calls. It is
obtained from the ITU and the World Telecommunication Indicators database. The travel
and tourism variable is defined as the sum of travellers in and out from a country as a
share of its population. It originates from the World Development Indicators and the
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World Tourism Organization. The receipts of transfers and payments are obtained from
the IMF and is measured as the sum of in- and out-transfer payments as a share of GDP.
The technology component builds on three variables: internet users, internet hosts and
secure internet servers. This component is very much internet specific and not reflecting
technology in a broad meaning. The first two variables are obtained from the ITU and
World Telecommunication Indicators database, while data on secure internet servers are
obtained from Netcraft.com surveys. The internet user variable is measured as a share of
population, while internet hosts and secured servers are measured per capita.
The last component, political engagement, is based on three variables including the
number of embassies in the country, number of memberships in international
organizations, and number of UN Security Council missions undertaken during a calendar
year. These are obtained from the Europe World Yearbook, Central Intelligence Agency
and various UN sources. Similar to the technology component, the political component is
to be considered a poor proxy of political perspectives of globalization.
The supplementary data on population and GDP are taken from the World Development
Indicators and the US Census Bureau, International database. A summary statistics of
the variables is given in Table 1.
From Table 1 we observe large variations among variables underlying the calculation of
the index and its components. The distribution of the index components is not uniform.
This is particularly evident in the case of the technology component a with large
dispersion and with the sample mean significantly higher than the median. In the case of
the political component the mean and median values overlap. The range of principal-
component-based index differs from those of Kearney-based weighted and unweighted
indices.
Correlation coefficients among various index components are presented in Table 2. As
expected, the various components are positively and mostly significantly correlated
among themselves. The economic integration component is negatively correlated over
time, while technology is positively correlated with time. The remaining personal and
political components as well as the two weighted and unweighted globalization indices
are not correlated with time. Application of different weights does not change the rank of
the countries much. The overall index is much dominated by political and economic
integration.
7
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combinations of the factors into economic and non-economic components should be possible.
Investigation of the nature of their causality relationship is outside the scope of this study.16
5 Variations in the globalization index
5.1 Country heterogeneity in globalization
Using the formula in equations (1) and (2), the two globalization indices are computed
for each of the 62 countries and for six years of observation. Following Kearney’s
approach a number of economic, personal and technology factors are given higher
weights than others (see Table 1). The countries are ranked by the heterogeneously
weighted index in descending order. For matters of sensitivity analysis the Kearney
index as a benchmark model is computed with equal weights as well. In order to
conserve space we have reported the mean of the three indices by country together with
the mean Gini and most recent years of Gini coefficient in Table 3A.
The results show that Iran, Peru, Ukraine, Colombia and Uganda are ranked as the least
globalized countries compared to Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, Sweden and Canada,
which rank as the five most globalized countries. Croatia, Egypt and Nigeria are among
the average globalized countries. Iran’s low rank is due to the consequences of the long
period of engagement in war with Iraq and the ongoing economic embargo, resulting in
a low economic, personal and technology components contributions to the overall
index. Internal and external conflicts seem to effectively reduce countries’ globalization
process. Taiwan is ranked as the 55th globalized country despite its high economic
development. The low rank is due to political and personal factors with limited
possibilities for the country to control. The high ranked countries share similar patterns
in the various components distribution. Minor deviations are the low economic factor in
the case of Canada and low political factor in the case of Singapore. Several exceptions
can be found, such as the Russian Federation. Russia is allocated a very high political
factor which is crucial for its rank (30) and France ranked as 14 has also the highest
political factor. The same is true in the case of China which despite its participation in
Security Council missions and a high number of embassies around the world ranked
only 42. The weighted index values decomposed by underlying components and by
country are reported in Figure 1.
Unlike the Kearney-based indices the principal-component-based index is positively
correlated (0.29) over time. It is highly correlated with weighted technological (0.73)
and personal (0.72) components and with the other two Kearney unweighted (0.88) and
weighted (0.88) indices. For details see Table 2 and Figure 2.8
The rank of countries by degree of globalization changes somewhat based on the
method of principal component analysis (Table 3A). Among the 10 most globalized
countries Canada 5 (6) and the Netherlands 6 (5) swap positions. The same applies to
Norway 7 (8) and the US 8 (7). The number after the countries indicates their positions
based on the Kearney weighted index, while the number in parenthesis indicates
positions based on the PC index. The transition of the least globalized countries is
                                                
8  For the principal component analysis we identified three eigenvalues exceeding one; 4.5862, 2.6419
and 1.3622. The proportion of the total variance explained by these principal components are: 0.3528,
0.2032 and 0.1048. The cumulative proportion of total variance explained is 0.6608. In order to
conserve space the results from principal component analysis for each component are not reported
here separately. Those can be obtained from the author upon request.17
somewhat higher than that of the most globalized ones. Ideally one should report the
transition steps over time for the selected index in a form of transition matrix. Later we
will discuss changes in the indices over time. Here the focus is on comparing mean
ranks of different indices.
5.2 Regional heterogeneity in globalization
The mean globalization by regions is presented in Table 3B. The ranking of regions
differs depending on whether identical or different weighting system is applied. As a
result of attaching a higher weight to the technology factor, sub-Saharan Africa, with
relative low technology component, switches its position with East Asia to a lower rank.
Based on equal weights, the South Asian region is identified as the least globalized
region. The low level of globalization is very much determined by the absence of the
technology factor. This picture is shared with the sub-Saharan African region.
The ranking based on the principal component analysis is similar to that of the Kearney-
based weighted index. An exception is the swap position between the Middle East and
North Africa (-0.569) and Latin American (-0.438) regions.
The Latin America and Middle East and North Africa regions are allocated a medium
average level of globalization. However, they differ by index components. For instance,
Latin America is advantageous in economic integration, while the Middle East and
North Africa enjoy better personal contacts and higher technology transfers. In terms of
political engagements they share, however, a very close position.
The East Asian region shows a high economic integration and technology transfer, but
globalization is found to be limited by relatively low personal contacts and political
engagements. The East European region is showing progress in all four factors, but yet
have low technology transfer. They have not been able to attract foreign investors or
benefits from the relocation of plants and production in response to their low wages
despite a relatively highly educated labour force.
The West European and South East Asian regions take the positions of the highest
globalized economic and geographic regions. The economic integration component for
the South East Asian region is higher, while the remaining three (in particular
technology and political) components are higher in West European. The South East
Asian countries differ by the degree of globalization; the index for Singapore is four
times that of Thailand caused mainly by the economic integration component. A similar
large dispersion is found among countries in the West European region,9 where Ireland
receives a score that is 10 times higher than that of the lowest ranked Greece.
Surprisingly Japan is placed next lowest. Its score is determined by the low levels of
economic integration and personal components.
                                                
9  In order to reduce the number of regions to a manageable level given the small sample size, Australia,
Japan, USA, and Canada are included as part of the West European region.18
5.3 The development of globalization over time
Based on individual country and time-varying index observations we have computed the
mean index and its components for each year of observation from 1995 to 2000. These
are reported in Table 3C and Figure 3. Ideally this should be weighted by the countries’
share of aggregate GDP (or population) to provide a more accurate picture of the
temporal changes in the global globalization process and the changes from the selected
index be shown in a transition matrix. Despite the weighting limitation and the short
period of observation it yet provides a partial picture of the development and
distribution of the globalization index. In terms of total GDP produced, size of
population and total trade, the included countries provide a satisfactory coverage of
globalization. Major economies and countries are included in the relatively small
sample.
The unweighted economic integration component increased during 1995 to 1997 from
0.73 to 0.86. It declined sharply to 0.60 in 1998 and remained below this level until
2000. The PC index continuously increased over time, and is to be preferred as it is not
restricted by assumption of the same weights or different weights chosen arbitrarily;
personal contact picks up in 1999. It varies in the interval 0.50 and 0.61 with no
systematic trend. The technology component continuously increased from 0.27 to 0.44.
The political component is constant over time and as expected does not change over a
short period.
The unweighted aggregated four components increased between 1995 and 1997. They
declined in 1998 and remained at the low level. The time pattern of the index is largely
influenced by economic integration. Similar patterns are found when economic
integration, personal contact and technology transfer sub-components are given
different weights.
The average annual changes in the index components and composite indices reported in
Table 3D confirm the discussion about temporal development of the variables.
However, the mean percentage annual changes calculated for each country and over
time are much higher than the percentage changes calculated based on annual means. In
the latter case the variations among countries are neglected. The neglected between
country variation is quite high as a share of the total variation. The presence of extreme
observations10 increases the percentage changes and the discrepancy between the two
measures. Due to the increasing patterns of the principal component index over time, its
per cent changes over time are all positive. The highest rates are found in 1995/96 and
1997/98.
                                                
10 Outlier or extreme observations include some transition countries (Czech Republic), countries
engaged in war (Iran) or countries with unstable economies (Turkey).19
6 The link between globalization and income inequality
Income inequality from a country perspective may depend on a number of internal and
external factors. Globalization is one main external factor.
6.1 Specification of the relationship
The link between globalization, income inequality and growth has for years been the
focus of much researcher attention.11 However, with the exception of a partial view in
studies like Mahler (2001) and Agénor (2003) who looked at the relationship between
inequality and the main modes of globalization (trade, FDI and financial openness), the
lack of a globalization index has not allowed statistical estimation and testing of the
relationship. In this section we aim to address this by the means of simple regression
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where GINI and GINDEX refer to the Gini coefficient and globalization index, REGION
is a J vector of regional dummies, u an error term and the subscript i refers to a country.
Since the two datasets, Kearney and WIID, do not overlap we were forced as a second
best alternative to use a cross sectional approach in establishing the relationship. The
Kearney database covers the period 1995-2000, while the WIID covers the period
before 1998. The former is a balanced panel data of 62 countries, while in the latter 146
countries are observed non-consecutively on an irregular basis. With the exception of a
number of industrialized countries the WIID sample countries are observed with long
interruption in the individual country time series.
The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income inequality. It is given as a means
of multiple observations for a given country in a given year. The multiplicity of
observations is due to the different definitions of income, area coverage and units of
measurement. It is defined here in two different ways. First, the most recent observation
(often 1996 to 1998) is used in the cross sectional regression analysis. A number of
countries (16) are observed prior to 1995. The second definition is used to avoid non-
overlapping inequality and WIID datasets and averaging out possible measurement
errors. Here instead of the last year of observation we use the mean Gini by country for
all years a country is observed as part of the WIID database. The degree of over- and
underestimation of income inequality due to trends in individual countries’ inequality
over the period is against the use of this approach.12
                                                
11 This study is limited to the relationship between inequality and globalization. However, the model can
be extended to incorporate the simultaneous inequality-growth-globalization relationship.
12 A third possible measure could be a population-weighted measure of inequality. In such a case all
variations among countries are eliminated. There is no use of such adjustment in cross sectional
analysis. The adjustment of Gini is based on the country’s share of total population of all countries
observed in a given year. Non-consecutive observation of countries with extremely large populations
makes the aggregate population fluctuate largely making the population adjustment not accurate or
probably less meaningful.20
The globalization index is defined in three different ways: the unweighted and weighted
Kearney-based indices and the PC index. In the unweighted case all 13 underlying
factors are given identical weights (w=1). The assumptions of equal weights are very
strong and have major implications for the index, its interpretation and the ranking of
countries. In order to avoid the assumption of equal weights, a number of factors on an
ad hoc basis are given double weights (w=2). Here we follow Kearney’s approach. The
factors include foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, international telephone
traffic and internet users. The principal component index is based on the first principal
component of the same 13 factors. It varies across countries and over time.
Since we use cross sectional regression analysis, it has not been possible to identify
unobservable country specific effects. However, in addition to the globalization index we
have added a number of dummy variables representing unobservable regional effects.13
These capture regional heterogeneity in income inequality. If income inequality differs
systematically among the regions or is affected differently as a consequence of
globalization, the dummies will pick up such effects. We observe similar patterns
regardless of the type of globalization index and whether any weights are used or not.
Correlation among the inequality and globalization indices are reported in Table 4.
6.2 The empirical relationship
The estimation results from a regression of the Gini coefficient on the globalization
index, when Gini is defined as the most recent year of observation, are reported in
Table 5A. Results based on an alternative definition where Gini is defined as mean
income inequality over time are reported in Table 5B. The Gini data are taken from the
WIID database. Regression results from the three Gini measures on principal
component measure of globalization are presented in Table 5C.
For sensitivity analysis, a number of alternative specifications of the simple relationship
(equation 3) are estimated. In the basic model in Table 5A (Model A1) variations in
income inequality are explained by an aggregate unweighted globalization index. The
coefficient is negative and statistically highly significant; it indicates a negative
relationship between the level of globalization and income inequality. However, due to
the cross-sectional nature of the sample it does not show how globalization as a process
affects inequality among countries. The same relationship applies when globalization is
differently weighted (Model A9). The inclusion of the squared globalization indices in
Models A1 and A9 were insignificant indicating absence of Kuznets U-shaped
relationship between inequality and globalization, based on the current sample. F-test
values indicate that an aggregate globalization index is a relevant explanatory variable.
However, globalization explains only 11 per cent of the variations in income inequality
among the 60 countries.14 This is in the line with Lindert and Williamson (2001) who
                                                
13 The countries are grouped into the following eight regions: Middle East and North Africa, East Asia,
South East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, East Europe and former Soviet
republics and West Europe. The latter with minor exceptions is equivalent to the OECD. See also note 9.
14 The income inequality variable for South Africa and Morocco is missing. These two countries are
excluded from the regression analysis.21
found the net impact of globalization too small to explain the long-term rise in world
inequality.
A decomposition of the composite globalization index into its four (m) sub-components
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The results (Models A2 to A5) show that economic integration and political
engagement do not individually explain any of the variations in income inequality.15
However, simultaneous inclusion of the four components (Model A6) indicates that
personal contacts and technology transfers reduce inequality, while economic
integration increases inequality. Political engagement is found to have no significant
effect. Personal contact is the single component contributing most to the explanation of
inequality variations. Economic integration and personal contacts are correlated
(Table 4) causing difficulties in separating the two effects.
To control for regional heterogeneity we added a number of regional dummies.
Accounting for regional heterogeneity (Model A7) captures most variations in
inequality among the countries. The explanatory power of the model increases from
0.11 to 0.64. Similar results are obtained when the globalization index is weighted
(Model A10), but the coefficient of determination increases to 0.69. However, the
globalization index turns out to be insignificant. Inferior education, chaotic institutions,
poor government and non-democracy could be the main sources of inequality, rather
than globalization (Lindert and Williamson, 2001). It should be noted that there is a risk
that regional (effects) inequality and globalization are correlated biasing the effects of
globalization on income inequality.
A further decomposition of the globalization index by its components (Model A8)
shows that personal contact is a main contributing factor to the negative relationship. In
a cross sectional case it is difficult to separate the effects of globalization from regional
specific effects not necessarily associated with the inequality impacts of the
globalization process. A possible solution to the confounded effects could be the use of
panel data to better be able to separate time and regional invariant and time and regional
variant effects from each other.
Regression results corresponding to Models A1 to A8, based on alternative definitions
of inequality, where mean Gini over time is used, are reported in Table 5B and labelled
as Models B1 to B8. The signs of coefficients are not changed. However, their
significance and sizes in a number of cases are changed. The regional variables play an
even more important role in the explanation of variation in inequality.
Regression results on the link between income inequality defined in two different ways
and globalization computed using principal component method are presented in
Table 5C. As in the previous cases the results indicate a negative relationship between
globalization and income inequality. The squared globalization index is positive
                                                
15 Agénor (2003) found a significant inverted U-shape relationship between globalization and poverty.
The index of globalization was based on trade and financial integration. The index is similar to our
economic integration component.22
(Models C2 and C5) indicating a U-shaped or declining negative relationship. The fit of
the model is somewhat lower compared to the two Kearney indices. Here we cannot
show differences in the direction of the impacts from a decomposition of the index into
its four underlying components as the index is obtained from a simultaneous analysis of
all 13 factors. Adding regional dummies to the relation produces similar results in terms
of signs, significance and the size of effects. Again the globalization index turns out to
be insignificant when regional dummies are added.
Our results are in line with Mahler (2001) who using LIS data found little evidence of a
systematic relationship between the three main modes of economic globalization
namely trade, outbound investment and financial openness and either the distribution of
disposable personal income or earnings of households. The overall conclusion is that
economic integration does not systematically lead to increased income inequality across
entire economies. The relationship between globalization and fiscal redistribution must
be established and modelled to make such an inference. Economic policy at country
level continues to play an important role in redistributive outcomes. As noted by Lindert
and Williamson (2001), increased world income inequality has been driven by between-
nations inequality rather than within-country inequality.
6.3 Guidelines to possible extensions
It is to be noted that the results presented here are to be considered as primary and
tentative. The results provide some initial support to the hypothesis of the existence of a
(negative) relationship between inequality and globalization but several essential
improvements are still necessary to confirm this finding.
The index should take an axiomatic approach that sets out its desirable properties and
provide a family of indexes that fulfil such properties. The first improvement should be
the globalization index itself and identification of the key dimensions; in its current
form it is just a partial index. The index should fully quantify globalization, in addition
to economic integration, personal contact, political engagement and technology transfer,
it should incorporate several other relevant components. These could include some
measure of cost-benefit ratio (analysis) of both micro and macro aspects of globalization
effects, impacts on standards of living, environmental aspects, wage inequality, skill
biased technological change, foreign trade volume and its direction, democracy and
conflict, financial markets, access to information and information flow and the
directions of movement of skilled labour between countries.
A specification, though based on a complete and representative index, still suffers from
a number of problems like the direction of causality, simultaneity and bias due to
omitted variables. Testing for poolability of the data and application of switching and
non-linear regressions would be desirable to group countries into different classes of
globalization levels. Industrialized countries dominate the current sample, with different
relationships between development, redistribution and inequality. The switching
regression is important to account for differences in responsiveness by level of
development, as there is indication that globalization enriches rich countries, at the
expense of poor countries. Additional tests will have to focus in particular on: tackling
the simultaneity problem and to control for growth issues as well as other components
left out of the globalization index. Non-linearity would also shed more light on the23
Kuznets inverted U-hypothesis about the inequality-growth relationship conditional on
globalization or the inequality-globalization relationship.
The sample of countries should be expanded to include more developing and transition
countries and ideally panel data static and dynamic estimation approaches could be
used. This would enable researchers to control for unobservable country specific effects
and to model the temporal patterns of key variables like inequality, growth and
globalization, country-specific rate of (skill-biased) rate of technological change.
Access to panel data would also enable identification of globalization effects by
performance comparison of countries over time, before and after globalization and by
the use of matching techniques. This would provide valuable information on
globalization, its consequences and redistributive policies to counteract the negative
impacts.
Quantification of globalization is a new field and quite scarce. There is need to account
for several dimensions and identify new ones as well as to test for their relevance in
computation of an index of globalization. Measurement issues play an important role in
empirical research, and a new index would differ from the ones presented above in a
number of ways. First, it would incorporate more components and be modelled non-
parametrically as well as parametrically where the weights are estimated rather than
chosen on an ad hoc basis. Second, it would compute disaggregated principal
component analysis and allow for time variation. Third, the index should be designed in
such a way that it can further be used for international, regional, and within-region
comparisons and in the evaluation of the impact of globalization on the welfare of
nations and sub-groups of a population within countries and regions. Fourth, one should
perform sensitivity analysis of the composite index by examining functional forms and
assessment and consistency of weights. These are important issues in the understanding
of how globalization functions and as a guide to policy formulation and evaluation.
An identification of major determinants of globalization, quantification of their effects
on the ranking of countries are key issues based on which policy options could be
provided. Since rich countries benefit most from the fruits of globalization, developing
countries need advantageous and non-protectionistic policies to effectively compete.
Analysis will help in identifying ways for a fair treatment of products, services and
people that enables poor countries to benefit from globalization to a greater extent.
This new database could serve as a source for researchers conducting empirical research
on globalization and its relation with other macro variables such as inequality in wages,
income or health, poverty and economic growth. The modified composite globalization
index will differ from the one above by incorporating more components like financial
markets, institutions, environment, democracy and conflict and be modelled non-
parametrically as well as parametrically where the weights are estimated rather than
chosen on an ad hoc basis. This will improve analysis of the determinants of
globalization by paying more attention to measurement problems, data issues and data
sources.24
7 Summary and conclusions
This study addresses the globalization index introduced by Kearney that quantifies the
level and development of the globalization process to rank countries. The index is
composed of four main components: economic integration, personal contact,
technology, and political engagements, each developing differently over time.
The results show that internal and external conflicts seem to effectively reduce
countries’ globalization prospects. The low rank of countries is often associated with
political and personal factors that several developing countries are unable to address.
The high ranked countries share similar patterns in various component distributions.
The mean globalization by region shows that technology factors play an important role
in the ranking of regions. This breakdown of the index into major components provides
possibilities to identify sources of globalization and associate it with economic policy
measures to bring about desirable changes in national and international policies.
In a regression analysis we investigate the relationship between inequality and
globalization. Results show that the globalization index explains only 7-11 per cent of
the variations in income inequality among the countries. By decomposing the aggregate
globalization index into four sub-components, results show that personal contacts and
technology transfers reduce inequality, while economic integration increases inequality.
Political engagement is found to have no significant effects on income inequality. When
controlling for regional heterogeneity, we find that the regional variable plays an
important role in the explanation of a variation in inequality.
Although the current version of the index quantifies the level of globalization it has
certain limitations and the results should be interpreted with caution; it is to be
considered as a simple and partial measure. We have addressed a number of extensions
to overcome several of the shortcomings, which concern an axiomatic approach to set
out the desirable properties of the index, identification and incorporation of more
dimensions or components and the use of non-parametric and a parametric estimation of
the index to avoid the choice of weights attached to each index component on an ad hoc
basis. The use of panel data will certainly shed light on the temporal patterns of
globalization and its regional variability. These are important issues in understanding
how globalization functions and how to use the generated information in policy
formulation and development evaluations.
In view of this, it must be noted that the simpler approach adopted here was mainly due
to problems of data availability and difficulties in the interpretation of the results of a
more complex specification. Globalization is considered a possible source and deriving
force of inequality differences across countries and over time. Identification and
quantification of its effects will have value to policy-makers’ resource allocation. This
research not only measures but also empirically links globalization to inequality. It is in
an early stage of development but has identified several directions along which future
advances can be made.25
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Table 1. Summary statistics, globalization data, 1995-2000, NT=62x6=372 observations
Variable Mean  Median  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum
A. Economic integration
Trade    0.7774 0.6750 0.5053 0.1570 3.4750
Foreign direct investment (w=2) 0.0426 0.0285 0.0501 0.0000 0.3307
Portfolio investment (w=2)  0.0575 0.0229 0.1498 0.0000 1.6693
Income payments and receipts  0.0899  0.0604  0.0986  0.0055  0.7821
B. Personal contacts
International telephone traffic (w=2) 97.4325  44.2450  128.9096  0.9000  707.4600
International travel and tourism (w=1) 0.8056 0.3480 1.0561 0.0030 6.3610
Transfer payments and receipts (w=1)  0.0335 0.0266 0.0298 0.0000 0.1504
C. Technology
Internet users (w=2)  0.0639 0.0178 0.1011 0.0000 0.5944
Internet hosts (w=1)  0.0126 0.0016 0.0272 0.0000 0.2950
Secure internet servers (w=1)  0.0111 0.0010 0.0294 0.0000 0.2830
D. Political engagements
Embassies in country (w=1)  71.6129 68.5000 34.1968 13.0000  172.0000
Membership in intl org. (w=1)  48.8065 47.8000 10.3816  6.0000 77.0000
Particip. in UN SC missions (w=1)    0.2512 0.2220 0.2051 0.0000 0.7780
1. Unweighted Kearney index components
Economic  integration  0.6770 0.5330 0.5850 0.0560 3.6580
Personal  contacts  0.5570 0.4800 0.4270 0.0140 2.3470
Technology    0.3690 0.0880 0.5450 0.0000 2.6050
Political  engagements  1.3770 1.3610 0.5400 0.0060 2.7010
Unweighted globalization index  2.9800 2.4370 1.4200 1.0690 7.9780
2. Weighted Kearney index components
Economic  integration  1.0070 0.7710 0.9130 0.0600 5.6580
Personal  contacts  0.7240 0.5760 0.6160 0.0240 3.2780
Technology  0.5370 0.1480 0.7620 0.0000 3.2090
Weighted globalization index  3.6460 2.8250 2.0350 1.1680  11.0550
3. Principal Component (PC) Analysis
First PC index 0.0000  -0.4310 1.0000  -1.0290  5.2500
Second PC index 0.0000  0.0950 1.0000  -4.2790  4.5530
Third PC index 0.0000  0.0430 1.0000  -6.8100  3.7200
Source: Author’s calculations.29
Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients, N = 372
               year  econom  economw  person personw  techno  technow  politi gindex gindexw princomp
year         1.0000
economic    -0.1380  1.0000
             0.0076
economic_w  -0.1653  0.9886  1.0000
             0.0014  0.0001
personal     0.0399  0.5871  0.5589  1.0000
             0.4423  0.0001  0.0001
personal_w   0.0351  0.6584  0.6352  0.9756  1.0000
             0.4992  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
technology   0.1150  0.2906  0.3151  0.3446  0.4524  1.0000
             0.0265  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
technology_w 0.1444  0.2991  0.3223  0.3578  0.4632  0.9927  1.0000
             0.0053  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
political    0.0046  0.0312  0.0893  0.0243  0.0836  0.3952  0.3817  1.0000
             0.9282  0.5475  0.0854  0.6403  0.1073  0.0001  0.0001
gindex       0.0010  0.7119  0.7303  0.6840  0.7700  0.7576  0.7572  0.5523  1.0000
             0.9832  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
gindex_w    -0.0082  0.7630  0.7852  0.6863  0.7832  0.7550  0.7607  0.4738  0.9909  1.0000
             0.8746  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
princomp     0.2946  0.6395  0.6420  0.6327  0.7227  0.7127  0.7283  0.3947  0.8774  0.8842  1.0000
             0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note:  …_w indicates weighted index component. Principal component index (princomp) is based on
the first principal component. p-values are given under the coefficients.30
Table 3A Globalization index by country, ranked by weighted index (gindexw)
Rank country econom econow person persow techno technw politi gindex gindexw pccomp pcrank gini mgini
 1 Ireland     2.477  3.615  1.899  2.738  0.560  0.779  1.510  6.446  8.643  2.697  1   36.96  36.80
 2 Singapore   2.729  3.947  1.551  2.530  0.920  1.365  0.734  5.935  8.575  2.152  2   38.11  42.49
 3 Switzerland 1.545  2.432  1.746  2.677  0.999  1.339  1.689  5.979  8.137  2.022  3   33.10  33.20
 4 Sweden      1.444  2.394  0.900  1.310  1.346  2.059  2.178  5.868  7.941  1.706  4   33.66  38.14
 5 Canada      0.872  1.348  0.825  1.361  1.467  2.027  2.434  5.598  7.170  1.428  6   30.05  30.83
 6 Netherlands 1.892  3.098  0.927  1.323  0.807  1.127  1.577  5.202  7.125  1.477  5   32.20  32.10
 7 Norway      0.874  1.410  0.836  1.205  1.699  2.581  1.685  5.094  6.881  1.260  8   39.42  30.74
 8 US          0.436  0.750  0.275  0.486  2.400  2.973  2.531  5.641  6.739  1.362  7   40.42  38.65
 9 Finland     0.790  1.253  0.731  0.991  1.752  2.524  1.818  5.091  6.586  1.231  9   31.50  29.33
10 Denmark     1.242  1.825  1.000  1.421  0.903  1.359  1.925  5.069  6.529  1.199 10   35.52  34.04
11 Austria     0.890  1.372  1.272  1.733  0.761  1.126  2.081  5.005  6.313  1.104 11   26.50  25.91
12 UK          1.265  1.924  0.545  0.875  0.736  1.050  2.181  4.727  6.030  0.983 12   37.27  30.87
13 New Zealand 0.603  0.907  0.699  1.133  1.311  1.729  1.144  3.757  4.913  0.652 13   30.33  45.61
14 France      0.683  1.131  0.479  0.708  0.302  0.473  2.564  4.028  4.875  0.574 15   32.70  38.14
15 Portugal    0.883  1.435  1.008  1.203  0.335  0.598  1.404  3.630  4.641  0.170 19   35.60  36.26
16 Germany     0.712  1.162  0.472  0.716  0.513  0.793  1.960  3.657  4.631  0.449 16   31.78  31.67
17 Australia   0.535  0.883  0.354  0.535  1.309  1.712  1.396  3.594  4.526  0.427 17   44.60  37.68
18 Czech Rep.  0.833  1.189  1.281  1.400  0.225  0.347  1.410  3.749  4.346  0.591 14   23.90  23.22
19 Italy       0.649  1.048  0.544  0.694  0.210  0.333  2.096  3.499  4.171  0.073 23   31.21  35.68
20 Spain       0.635  1.051  0.676  0.825  0.297  0.444  1.530  3.139  3.850  0.104 22   23.70  30.93
21 Malaysia    1.159  1.500  0.642  0.751  0.145  0.261  1.244  3.190  3.756  0.153 21   48.50  47.71
22 Panama      1.943  2.607  0.322  0.415  0.039  0.061  0.642  2.947  3.725  0.196 18   52.03  49.22
23 Hungary     0.898  1.320  0.690  0.794  0.165  0.253  1.283  3.036  3.650  0.154 20   25.30  24.61
24 Israel      0.547  0.757  0.999  1.306  0.536  0.739  0.764  2.847  3.566 -0.101 24   38.20  32.70
25 Poland      0.412  0.639  0.565  0.632  0.124  0.214  1.891  2.991  3.376 -0.103 25   32.70  26.60
26 Argentina   0.473  0.829  0.091  0.124  0.056  0.090  1.981  2.600  3.024 -0.286 28   46.66  51.79
27 Japan       0.284  0.419  0.073  0.119  0.549  0.906  1.496  2.403  2.940 -0.266 27   24.90  35.53
28 Greece      0.223  0.310  0.861  1.075  0.154  0.256  1.278  2.515  2.919 -0.331 29   32.70  41.56
29 Chile       0.784  1.326  0.197  0.251  0.106  0.178  1.124  2.211  2.879 -0.266 26   55.51  50.93
30 Russian Fed 0.322  0.461  0.090  0.115  0.032  0.056  2.168  2.613  2.801 -0.444 34   39.57  34.14
31 Saudi Arab- 0.518  0.737  0.959  1.065  0.009  0.018  0.979  2.464  2.799 -0.682 52     .      .
32 Nigeria     0.617  0.819  0.305  0.307  0.001  0.001  1.653  2.576  2.781 -0.410 32   50.30  43.20
33 Egypt       0.242  0.321  0.496  0.511  0.005  0.010  1.904  2.647  2.747 -0.582 43   28.90  33.72
34 Croatia     0.547  0.788  0.873  1.164  0.111  0.180  0.594  2.125  2.727 -0.421 33   30.06  25.68
35 Korea Rep.  0.478  0.730  0.258  0.313  0.322  0.597  1.058  2.116  2.698 -0.469 35   31.60  34.18
36 Botswana    0.811  0.930  1.153  1.224  0.017  0.029  0.477  2.458  2.659 -0.524 38   52.30  53.90
37 Slovenia    0.510  0.634  0.490  0.717  0.514  0.767  0.500  2.014  2.618 -0.359 30   29.69  25.66
38 Slovak Rep. 0.631  0.820  0.412  0.512  0.209  0.370  0.875  2.127  2.576 -0.376 31   23.70  21.99
39 Tunisia     0.441  0.554  0.507  0.556  0.005  0.010  1.288  2.241  2.407 -0.519 37   40.41  44.92
40 Mexico      0.550  0.835  0.235  0.314  0.041  0.068  1.122  1.947  2.340 -0.508 36   51.97  51.08
41 Pakistan    0.186  0.247  0.378  0.385  0.001  0.001  1.674  2.238  2.307 -0.675 51   31.20  34.26
42 China       0.393  0.647  0.043  0.047  0.009  0.017  1.577  2.022  2.289 -0.617 44   40.30  29.35
43 Senegal     0.350  0.456  0.535  0.555  0.003  0.006  1.263  2.151  2.279 -0.685 53   41.30  49.96
44 Venezuela   0.467  0.713  0.102  0.133  0.038  0.067  1.312  1.919  2.226 -0.528 39   47.24  42.90
45 SouthAfrica 0.507  0.844  0.123  0.155  0.145  0.230  0.985  1.759  2.215 -0.635 47   59.00  54.89
46 India       0.166  0.286  0.215  0.216  0.004  0.008  1.697  2.082  2.208 -0.667 49   35.45  34.55
47 Indonesia   0.451  0.619  0.069  0.072  0.006  0.012  1.492  2.018  2.195 -0.572 42   35.27  36.36
48 Kenya       0.196  0.209  0.495  0.500  0.003  0.005  1.459  2.153  2.173 -0.774 58   51.00  60.69
49 Philippine  0.802  1.086  0.161  0.185  0.013  0.025  0.876  1.852  2.172 -0.564 40   47.90  46.94
50 Romania     0.345  0.503  0.303  0.339  0.044  0.079  1.207  1.899  2.128 -0.624 45   36.37  26.38
51 Thailand    0.647  0.898  0.133  0.149  0.021  0.036  1.034  1.835  2.117 -0.569 41   41.75  45.03
52 Bangladesh  0.076  0.092  0.414  0.414  0.000  0.000  1.609  2.099  2.116 -0.769 57   38.80  37.68
53 Brazil      0.258  0.467  0.045  0.056  0.059  0.091  1.464  1.825  2.078 -0.629 46   58.84  54.99
54 Turkey      0.260  0.345  0.278  0.318  0.036  0.062  1.301  1.875  2.026 -0.667 50   45.62  49.21
55 Taiwan      0.530  0.740  0.372  0.502  0.427  0.725  0.010  1.339  1.977 -0.647 48   31.70  33.04
56 Sri Lanka   0.406  0.528  0.597  0.612  0.006  0.011  0.721  1.730  1.872 -0.851 59   34.40  40.40
57 Morocco     0.234  0.249  0.599  0.634  0.003  0.005  0.953  1.789  1.841 -0.863 60     .      .
58 Uganda      0.221  0.354  0.824  0.824  0.001  0.002  0.619  1.664  1.799 -0.992 62   39.20  37.19
59 Colombia    0.347  0.590  0.133  0.163  0.031  0.056  0.962  1.472  1.770 -0.732 54   57.10  51.79
60 Ukraine     0.349  0.444  0.240  0.273  0.010  0.017  1.033  1.632  1.766 -0.750 55   32.94  28.43
61 Peru        0.342  0.547  0.159  0.182  0.021  0.039  0.899  1.422  1.668 -0.754 56   49.00  49.46
62 Iran        0.085  0.087  0.049  0.057  0.002  0.005  1.055  1.191  1.203 -0.953 61   42.90  45.59
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note:  w at the end of a variable indicates weighted index component. The principal component index
(pccomp) is based on the first principal component. Gini and mgini are the last period and mean
period Gini coefficients.31
Table 3B Globalization index by region,
 ranked by descending order of weighted globalization index
Region  Econo.   Econo. Person.   Person.  Techn.  Techn. Political  GIndex  GIndex Principal
weighted weighted weighted  weighted Comp.
West Europe  0.947   1.488   0.806   1.156   0.921   1.309   1.824   4.497    5.778  0.916
South East Asia  1.158   1.610   0.511   0.737   0.221   0.340   1.076   2.966   3.763  0.120
East Europe  0.539   0.755   0.549   0.661   0.159   0.253   1.218   2.465   2.887  -0.259
Middle E&N Africa  0.374   0.494   0.640   0.732   0.099   0.141   1.198   2.311   2.564  -0.569
Latin America  0.645   0.989   0.161   0.205   0.049   0.081   1.188   2.043   2.464  -0.438
East Asia  0.467   0.706   0.225   0.287   0.253   0.446   0.881   1.826   2.321  -0.578
sub-Saharan Africa   0.450   0.602   0.572   0.594   0.028   0.045   1.076   2.127   2.318  -0.670
South Asia   0.184   0.248   0.331   0.337   0.003   0.005   1.351   1.868   1.941  -0.783
Table 3C Globalization index over time
Year  Econo.   Econo. Person.   Person.  Techn.  Techn. Political  GIndex  GIndex Principal
weighted weighted weighted  weighted Comp.
1995   0.726   1.120   0.522   0.682   0.266   0.364   1.380   2.893   3.546 -0.340
1996   0.760   1.156   0.576   0.745   0.316   0.450   1.374   3.026   3.725  -0.280
1997   0.861   1.313   0.522   0.677   0.349   0.492   1.359   3.091   3.841 -0.157
1998   0.595   0.865   0.543   0.715   0.404   0.585   1.388   2.929   3.553  0.021
1999   0.545   0.762   0.612   0.790   0.441   0.662   1.380   2.978   3.595  0.235
2000   0.577   0.828   0.566   0.736   0.438   0.669   1.381   2.961   3.614  0.521
Table 3D Percentage change in globalization index over time
Year  Econo.   Econo. Person.   Person.  Techn.  Techn. Political  GIndex  GIndex Principal
weighted weighted weighted  weighted Comp.
1995/1996  10.07   11.51   18.80   15.70   74.23   74.20   -0.02  5.43  6.15  45.08
1996/1997  16.93   19.52   -8.05   -8.05   32.25   27.12   -0.33  2.53  3.77  18.90
1997/1998   -28.19  -30.18  3.27  3.99   56.89   59.28  2.20   -5.23   -7.17  28.85
1998/1999  -9.41  -13.53   16.96   14.81   52.85   55.74  0.67  1.82  0.80  19.48
1999/2000   9.06   13.07   -6.79   -6.52   29.65   30.95  0.63   -0.55  0.41  19.5432
Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients, N=60-62
              gini    mgini    econom   person   techno   politi   gindex  gindexw  princomp
gini        1.0000
mgini       0.8411   1.0000
            0.0001
economic   -0.0654  -0.0825   1.0000
            0.6193   0.5306
personal   -0.3736  -0.2981   0.6482   1.0000
            0.0033   0.0207   0.0001
technology -0.2249  -0.2731   0.3658   0.3506   1.0000
            0.0385   0.0347   0.0035   0.0052
political  -0.2249  -0.2082   0.0392   0.0243   0.4074   1.0000
            0.0840   0.1103   0.7620   0.8510   0.0010
gindex     -0.3261  -0.3053   0.7294   0.6909   0.7826   0.5622   1.0000
            0.0110   0.0177   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001
gindexw    -0.3141  -0.2982   0.7741   0.6989   0.7866   0.4876   0.9921   1.0000
            0.0145   0.0206   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001
princomp   -0.3024  -0.2924   0.8031   0.6894   0.7652   0.4525   0.9786   0.9899   1.0000
            0.0189   0.0234   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0002   0.0001   0.0001
Source: Authors calculations.
Note:  p-values are given under the coefficients. Gindexw indicates weighted globalization index. The
principal component index (princomp) is based on the first principal component. Gini and mgini
are the last period and mean period Gini coefficients.33
Table 5A Least squares parameter estimates of the link between most recent years of Gini coefficient and Kearney globalization index
Unweighted globalization index Weighted globaliz. index
Explanatory variables Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 Model A7 Model A8 Model A9 Model A10
Intercept 45.8642 a 37.5410 a 34.2443 a 34.8352 a 38.4699 a 33.1074 a 34.1586 a 32.4836 a 45.2898 a 39.4501 a
Log globalization index -7.4923 a - -0.6478  . - - -
Log global. index weighted - - - -6.9937 a -3.4690  .
Log economic integration -1.2966 . 5.6459 a - 2.2652  . - -
Log personal contact -4.2817 a -4.9815 a - -3.4258 a - -
Log technology -1.4236 a -1.5797 a - 0.9266  . - -
Log political engagement -0.6328 . -0.5762  . - 0.2540  . - -
Middle East & North Africa - 4.6848  . 9.2010 b - 3.4092  .
East Asia -  0.7517  . -0.0385  . - -5.8351  .
South East Asia - 8.7789 a 8.3152 b - 7.5161 b
South Asia - 2.7820  . 7.7295 c - 0.8502  .
Latin America - 18.5843 a 17.3636 a - 13.2485 a
sub-Saharan Africa - 15.1725 a 20.7833 a - 12.7544 a
East Europe - -3.1218  . -1.1671  . - -9.1353 a
West Europe (reference) -----
R-square adjusted 0.1119 -0.0068 0.1804 0.1026 -0.0145 0.2650 0.6381 0.6823 0.0952 0.6870
F-value 8.4300 a 0.6000 . 13.9800 a 7.6300 a 0.1500 . 6.2300 a 14.000 a 12.3200 a 7.2000 a 17.1900 a
RMSE 8.6873 9.2495 8.3457 8.8074 9.2851 7.9709 5.5458 5.2403 8.7734 5.1599
Number of observations 60 60 60 59 60 59 59 59 60 60
Source: Authors  calculations.
Notes:  Significant at less than 1%(a), 1-5%(b), 5-10%(c), and greater than 10%(.) level of significance. The square of weighted and unweighted globalization indices in
Models A1 and A9 are insignificant indicating absence of U-shaped relationship between inequality and globalization. RMSE is root mean square error.34
Table 5B Least squares parameter estimates of the periods mean Gini coefficient and Kearney unweighted globalization index
Explanatory variables Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 Model B5 Model B6 Model B7 Model B8
Intercept 45.3279 a 37.0677 a 35.1122 a 34.6584 a 38.4625 a 33.5454 a 40.4570 a 34.4025 a
Log globalization index -6.9450 a - -3.9352 . -
Log economic integration -2.0444 . 3.1425  . - -1.6489  .
Log personal contact -3.3687 a -3.1366 b - -1.2446  .
Log technology -1.5000 a -1.5194 b - 0.8357  .
Log political engagement -0.6325 . -0.4916  . - -0.5138  .
Middle East & North Africa - 3.0800  . 6.3293 c
East Asia - -5.9775  . -4.5869  .
South East Asia - 7.0789 b 10.1603 a
South Asia - 0.4034  . 4.7272  .
Latin America - 12.5126 a 15.0133 a
sub-Saharan Africa - 12.5341 a 17.5498 a
East Europe - -10.7333 a -8.2671 a
West Europe (reference) ---
R-square adjusted 0.0918 0.0082 0.1023 0.1128 -0.0146 0.1427 0.7129 0.7118
F-value 6.9600 a 1.4900 . 7.7200 a 8.3700 a 0.1500 . 3.4100 b 19.3200 a 14.0200 a
RMSE 8.8877 9.2877 8.8363 8.8593 9.3939 8.7086 4.9966 5.0492
Number of observations 60 60 60 59 60 59 59 59
Source: Author’s  calculations.
Notes:  Significant at less than 1%(a), 1-5%(b), 5-10%(c), and greater than 10%(.) level of significance. The square of the unweighted globalization index in Model B1 is
insignificant indicating absence of U-shaped relationship between inequality and globalization. RMSE is root mean square error.35
Table 5C Least squares parameter estimates of the link between the Gini and principal component globalization indices
Dep. variable is Last year Gini Dep. variable is period mean Gini
Explanatory variables Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4 Model C5 Model C6
Intercept 38.4299 a 36.6807 a 32.9729 a 38.4209 a 36.4696 a 35.8406 a
Principal component globalization index -3.1456 b -5.6839 a 0.2568  . -3.0770 b -5.9084 a -1.2632  .
Squared principal comp. global. Index - 2.3479 c - - 2.6190 c -
Middle East & North Africa - - 5.4308  . - - 3.7066  .
East Asia - - 1.7087  . - - -4.3802  .
South East Asia - - 9.3033 a - - 8.0168 a
South Asia - - 3.7795  . - - 1.6664  .
Latin America - - 19.4381 a - - 13.8757 a
sub-Saharan Africa - - 16.0495 a - - 13.2845 a
East Europe - - -2.4331  . - - -9.8667 a
W e s t  E u r o p e  ( r e f e r e n c e ) ------
R-square adjusted 0.0758 0.1030 0.6380 0.0697 0.1063 0.7053
F-value 5.8400 b 5.3900 b 14.0000 a 5.4200 b 4.5100 b 18.6500 a
RMSE 8.8622 8.7305 5.5466 8.9951 8.9951 5.0630
Number of observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
Source: Authors  calculations.
Note:  Significant at less than 1%(a), 1-5%(b), 5-10%(c), and greater than 10%(.) level of significance.36
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